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This paper probes some of the global economic forces that have contributed to the oitgoing
precarious global food security situation, especially in the years since the 2007 to 2008
food crisis. Since the crisis hit at a time when global food production per capita was
rising, it is important that policies addressing hunger incorporate dimensions beyond food
production. There has been some acknowledgement of the role of global economic forces
in the food crisis by global policymakers, but global food security initiatives still largely
emphasize increased food production over other measures. The paper concludes that more
needs to be done to ensure that the rules that govern the global economy—especially those
regarding international trade, finance, and investment—do not work against the goal of
food security.
Since the 2007 to 2008 food crisis, food security has become a prominentissue on the global poUcy agenda. Continued instability of global food prices
since the initial price spikes has given rise to a concern that a new crisis could
emerge at any time. A number of global governance initiatives for food security
have been announced in recent years. These include efforts to channel funding
into increasing agricultural productivity in the developing world. This approach to
food security resonates with what has been labeled by many as a "productionist"
approach to food security, which anticipates future food shortages and prescribes
increased food production as the primary means to achieve enhanced global food
security.'
Although the production of sufficient quantities of food is a prerequisite for
food security, other equally important factors must also be addressed to achieve
adequate access to food for all. The world currently produces in caloric terms more
food than is needed to meet this objective, and food output per capita on a global
scale has been rising, even through the recent crisis period.^ However, because
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food crises can erupt even when there is sufficient food available, it is important
for food security policy to include measures beyond simply boosting production.
In particular, policy measures that seek to improve distribution and access must
also be integrated into food security policy.^  Global economic relationships, such
as trade, finance, and investment, as well as the rules that govern those relation-
ships, set the international policy context and affect food security in complex and
significant ways."*
840 million in this paper I call attention to important
p e o p l e i n t h e w o r l d features of the global economy that are widely
are Chronicallv associated with ongoing global food insecurity in
^^^ world's poorest countries, and which deserve
more attention, and action, in policy circles. These
the scale of global include economic policies that largely originate
h u n g e r is e S D e c i a l l v ^^ wealthier, more industrialized countries that
IT . ,1 contribute to higher and more volatile food prices
troubling, given that , j - u • r . , . • V ,
o ' o and uneven distribution of food and agricultural
w o r l d p r o d u c e s investments. Global policy responses continue
f o o d t o m e e t '-^  prioritize productivity measures within the
|-,pp/-jo existing global economic governance framework,
rather than transforming that very framework in
ways that better support food security.
HUNGER AND THE IMPORTANCE OF POLICIES THAT AFFECT ACCESS TO FOOD
Hunger remains a serious global problem. Over 840 million people in the
world are chronically undernourished, but due to the manner in which hunger is
measured, this figure may underestimate the true scale of the problem. The main
indicator of hunger used by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the
Prevalence of Undernourishment (PoU), is very narrow in scope.^  It measures the
number of people consistently receiving fewer gross calories than necessary to live
a sedentary lifestyle for over a year.* Given that many, if not most, of the poorest
people in the world have activity levels that are far from sedentary, and often
experience acute hunger on a seasonal basis, the PoU risks missing a large number
of people who do not have adequate access to food.' Even short-term episodes of
acute hunger can be devastating for small children and pregnant women. A focus
on calories alone does not tell us much at all about the nutritional quality of food
or implications of low nutritional quality, such as micronutrient deficiencies or
stunting. In India, for example, nearly half of all children under the age of five are
stunted, and more than 25 percent of children worldwide have an inadequate diet
during their key growth years.^
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The scale of global hunger is especially troubling, given that the world pro-
duces enough food to meet human needs. Data from the FAO indicate that on an
average, there are 2800 calories available per person, after livestock are fed and
after post-harvest losses are accounted for, which is an amount that far exceeds the
2100 calories an average person requires per day to maintain health.'^  FAO data
also reveal that world food production per capita has actually been rising in recent
years.'" However, it is unclear whether this situation of sufficient global food avail-
ability will continue. This uncertainty, combined with production deficits in some
countries, drives most of the production-oriented initiatives for food security. A
productionist approach, however, only addresses one aspect of the problem, and
fails to sufficiently delve into some of the deeper causes of hunger that exist today.
Uneven distribution of both food production and food trade, and poor access
to food, are the key reasons that people continue to go hungry in this world of
plenty." Nobel prize-winning economist Amartya Sen's path-breaking work in the
early 1980s demonstrated that access to food is key to understanding hunger, and
that focusing on food availability alone to guide policy can have disastrous results,
as was the case with devastating famines in Bengal in 1943 and in Bangladesh in
1974, among others.'^ This work fundamentally transformed the understanding
of the determinants of hunger, which previously had centered almost exclusively
on food availability. A person's income, position in society, and the productive
resources and other assets available for production and trade are now widely seen
to be other important determinants of access to food.
Today, the FAO features access as one of four key pillars of food security,
alongside availability, utilization (nutrition), and stability.'^ Political systems and
economic frameworks strongly influence the broader conditions that determine
food security. As Drèze and Sen note, an access-centered approach to food secu-
rity, "compels us to take a broad view of the ways in which access to food can
be protected or promoted, including the legal framework within which economic
relations take place."''' The factors that determine access to food are often exam-
ined in a national or regional context, with a focus on democratic institutions
and economic frameworks in hunger-prone countries and regions. This focus is
important. But in an increasingly globalized world where food systems are closely
intertwined with global economic relations in complex ways, we must also take the
international economic and regulatory context into account when both analyzing
the factors that affect food security and framing policy.
ECONOMIC POLICIES ASSOCIATED WITH HIGHER AND MORE VOLATILE FOOD
PRICES
World food prices have increased, and have become markedly more volatile
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over the past decade. Volatility can have an enormous impact on people's access
to food, especially in the world's poorest countries.'^ In Pakistan and Ghana,
the poorest 20 percent of the population spends over 70 percent of their income
on food.'^  Steep rises in food prices can easily overwhelm a poor family's entire
budget, resulting in an immediate decline in food consumption, as well as an
increase in poverty.'*"
A number of complex factors contribute to food price volatility'^ Over the
medium- and long-term, food supply and demand factors can influence food prices
and their variability. Lower food stocks, for example, can lead to panic in markets,
which can drive prices higher, while changing diets can increase demand for grains
over the longer run, possibly affecting long-term price trends.'^ But while supply
and demand factors were featured in many popular accounts of food price volatility,
it is noteworthy that during the recent food price crisis, while prices climbed so
rapidly and sharply, there was no decline in food production per capita.^^ Indeed,
since the recent food crisis, it is widely recognized that other short-term factors
played a significant role in triggering and exacerbating food price volatility.^'
These include a number of economic policies pursued in wealthier countries such
as financial deregulation, biofuel policies, and trade policies, as explained below.
Financial Sector Policies and Commodity Speculation
Speculative investments in commodity futures and other agricultural deriva-
tives have increased significantly since 2006, following the deregulation of the key
financial markets—including in the United States and European Union—over the
previous decade.-- The relaxation of curbs on speculative investments, and the
relative lack of regulation on new commodity derivatives, such as index funds, in
these key financial markets helped to fuel these investments. Investors became
interested in agriculture-linked financial investments as a "hedge against inflation"
in a turbulent economic context. Indeed, speculative investment in agricultural
commodities almost doubled from USD $65 billion in 2006 to USD $126 billion
in 20l\P In the United States wheat-futures market, financial speculators' share
of the trade increased from 12 percent in the mid-1990s to 61 percent in 2011.2''
Some argue that the increase in commodity speculation pushed up food prices
and made them more volatile.^^ From 2006 to 2008, average world prices for rice
rose by 217 percent, wheat by 136 percent, maize by 125 percent, and soybean
by 107 percent.2^ As food prices rose sharply in mid-2008, the FAO reported that
volatility in the prices of bulk commodities had risen and reached unprecedented
levels.^ ^ These conditions led to calls for tighter financial regulation to reduce
food price volatility.^ ** Others argue that despite the correlation, there is little hard
evidence that speculation was a primary driver of food price increases, and that
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speculation In fact plays a role in smoothing market prices by providing liquidity
to agricultural markets.^^
Amidst this debate, a growing number of organizations have taken the posi-
tion that commodity speculation exacerbated food price trends even if it was not
the main culprit. The Bank for International Settlements and several UN reports
noted that financial investment in commodities can potentially influence prices
for those commodities, especially in the short-term.^" Although the debate over the
impact of speculation on food prices will likely
continue, there appears to be a growing con-
sensus that speculation plays a role in explaining j^ dramatic rise in
price volatility.
the production of
Biofuel Policies biofuds from non-
Policies that encourage investment in biofuel food CrODS Can affeCt
production have been directly associated with r j j ^•
c ^ • , •,• u J J .1 A. r o o d p r o d u c t i o n
rood price volatility over the past decade."" Many i
countries have implemented biofuel policies such DeCaUSe DlOrUcl
as blending mandates and subsidies for renewable produCtion
fuel production, which encourages a large-scale t v D Í C a l l v U t i l i z C S l a n d
diversion of food crops into fuel uses.^ ^ Although ^ 1 j U U
non-food crops can be used as feedstock in the ^ ^ ^ ^ COUld h a V e b e e n
production of biofuels, in some countries, such USecl tO prOClUCe lOOCl
as the United States, the main crop used for this CrODS
purpose is maize, a major coarse grain in global
food markets. A dramatic rise in the production '
of biofuels from non-food crops can affect food production because production
typically utilizes land that could have been used to produce food crops. There are
varying estimates of the extent to which biofuels are responsible for rising food
and agricultural commodity prices, ranging from a minimal effect to as high as 70
percent. A recent work by the National Academy of Sciences surveyed these studies
and estimated that approximately 20 to 40 percent of agricultural commodity
price increases in recent years is attributable to the boom in biofuel production.^^
Biofuel policy in the United States is especially significant. As the world's
largest producer of maize, the United States has seen a rising percentage of its
production of this crop being diverted into the production of ethanol. In 2000,
roughly 7 percent of U.S. maize production was used for fuel production, and by
2012 that figure was close to 45 percent. '^* This large shift resulted in over 15
percent of global maize production, which is the equivalent of 6 percent of global
grain production, being diverted from food uses into to biofuel production. The
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increased diversion of maize into biofuel production has from 2007 to 2012 added
USD $6.6 billion to the cost of food imports to developing countries.^^
Export Restrictions
Restrictions on exports can also affect food prices. The WTO imposes rules
on its members to prevent restrictions on food imports, but does not have a clear
set of rules on restrictions of food exports. In the recent period of higher and more
volatile food prices, some countries that normally export some of their food have
imposed a ban on those exports in a bid to lower prices at home, and to insulate the
domestic market from international price fluctuations.^'' Such policies are typically
imposed in response to a shock that affects prices or supply. Export restrictions
may protect domestic food prices from sharp increases, but they can have the effect
of exacerbating price increases in international markets, which adversely affects
those countries that depend on food imports.^^
Between 2006 and 2008, a number of countries imposed bans on food exports,
including India, Vietnam, Egypt, China, and Cambodia.^ ** These moves were
widely criticized for their impact on world food prices, as prices of some commodi-
ties, such as wheat and rice, rose sharply at exactly the same time when these poli-
cies were imposed.^ ** Emergency operations of the World Food Programme (WEP),
which procures food for its assistance programs in a variety of countries around
the world, were also affected by these policies.'"' Food prices were influenced by
export restrictions again in 2010, when Russia imposed an export ban in the face
of regional production shortfalls, which had an immediate upward effect on world
grain prices.'"
The international consequences of these various policies can reinforce one
another. Rising prices due to the diversion of food crops to fuel uses can push world
food prices higher, in turn encouraging other countries to impose export restric-
tions, which in turn can encourage financial speculation on commodity markets as
financiers seek to capture profits from rising and volatile food prices. The result is a
dynamic situation in which different forces interact with one another and increase
price volatility.
POLICIES THAT CONTRIBUTE TO AN UNEVEN WORLD FOOD ECONOMY
Higher and more volatile food prices on world markets have particularly harsh
consequences on the world's poorest countries due to their increasing dependence
on imported food. Most of the world's forty-eight Least Developed Countries
(LDCs) are net food importers.*'^  These countries have the highest proportion of
their populations suffering from hunger and undernutrition, and are therefore the
most vulnerable to changes in world food prices.''^ In the 1960s and 1970s, the
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LDCs exported roughly the same value of agricultural products as they imported.
Starting in the mid-1980s, LDCs became net agricultural importers, with imports
far outpacing exports in recent years.'*'* Higher food prices on world markets have
imposed an enormous burden on these countries, as their food import bills have
risen sharply, with price effects far outweighing volume effects."*^  Since the early
1990s, the volume of cereal imports of the LDCs increased by a factor of three,
while the value of those imports increased by
over sixfold.'*''
A complex set of forces has contributed to
weak agricultural sector performance and rising
dependence on food imports in some of the
world's poorest countries."*' Although domestic
factors such as land availability and crop yields
play a role, there is a growing recognition of
the international economic forces that also
contribute to these trends. This paper focuses
on the ways in which international trade, aid,
and investment policies and practices play a
role in affecting food security and agricultural
outcomes in the world's poorest countries.
A complex set of
forces has contributed
to weak agricultural
sector performance
riSmg dependence
on food imports in
some of the world's
poorest countries.
Skewed Agricultural Trade Policies
International agricultural trade policies are highly uneven, and contribute to
weak agricultural performance and food insecurity in the world's least developed
countries. On the one hand, many rich industrialized countries have long subsi-
dized their agricultural sectors to encourage production and exports, while dis-
criminating against imported foods through the use of tariffs. On the other hand,
since the 1980s, many developing countries implemented policies to liberalize
their own agricultural trade policies in return for World Bank-sponsored structural
adjustment loans.'"^ The combined effect of these policies was to facilitate easy and
cheap food imports to the world's poorest countries, which acted as a powerful
disincentive for investment in the agricultural sector in developing countries.
The aim of the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was to bring about liberalization of
agricultural trade policies in all member countries. The final agreement, however,
instead institutionalized the imbalance in trade practices between rich and poor
countries.'" Under the agreement, rich countries were able to keep their subsidies
at high levels because they were able to move them into categories of support that
were exempt from cuts. Further, the tariff cuts in the poor countries were relatively
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more significant than those in the rich countries because they had already made
substantial tariff cuts under structural adjustment programs a decade earlier.^"
The uneven nature of agricultural trade liberalization, as codified by WTO
rules, has contributed to the growing dependence on imported food in the world's
poorest countries.^' Before the 2007 to 2008 food crisis, many poor countries com-
plained about surges of cheap, subsidized imports of food, typically staple cereals,
from industrialized countries that hurt domestic
farmers, as the prices of domestic production were
unable to compete with the prices of those imports.^^
Senegal, for example, saw its rice imports doubling
and even tripling over short periods of time since the
1990s." Such competition from industrialized coun-
tries discouraged developing country farmers from
pursuing agriculture as a livelihood, which only
further contributed to these countries' dependence
on imported food.
A large number of
African countries
including Ethiopia,
Uganda, Senegal,
the Democratic
Republic of Congo,
Liberia, and
Zambia have trans-
ferred enormous
tracts of land—
sometimes in the
millions of hect-
ares—to foreign
and domestic
private investors.
Shifts in Agricultural Investment Policies
Levels of public investment in agriculture in
developing countries have changed in recent decades.
International development assistance for agriculture
in particular fell sharply from the early 1980s to the
early 2000s. Approximately 30 percent of the World
Bank's lending was channeled into agriculture in
the 1980s, but this dropped to just 12 percent by
2007.^'' Similarly, over 20 percent of official develop-
ment assistance (ODA) was agricultural aid in the
early 1980s but the number fell to under 5 percent
by 2007.^ ^ This drop in investment is in some ways not surprising, given that low
world food prices for much of the 1980s to 1990s meant that it was cheaper to
import subsidized food from industrialized countries than it was to grow it domes-
tically. As a result, the capacity to ramp up production in the poorest food import
dependent countries was severely weakened, the consequences of which became
starkly evident once food prices spiked between 2007 and 2008.
When public investment in agriculture in developing countries declined,
private agricultural investment in these countries increased. The acquisition by
financial investors of large tracts of land and stakes in farming operations in devel-
oping countries, for example, has seen a dramatic increase since 2006.^^ A large
number of African countries including Ethiopia, Uganda, Senegal, the Democratic
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Republic of Congo, Liberia, and Zambia have transferred enormous tracts of
land—sometimes in millions of hectares—to foreign and domestic private investors
who then established large-scale industrial farms for the production of both food
and industrial crops.^'
Although private-sector initiatives may be attractive to recipient countries as
a way to provide much needed capital for the agricultural sector, the shift from
public to private sources of investment in agriculture carries a number of risks.
There are numerous studies linking large-scale land investments to displacement of
smallholder farmers, affecting their livelihoods and access to food.^ ** In a number
of cases, these investments are explicitly for the production of food and biofuel
crops for export to investor countries, rather than for domestic food production.''
There are also linkages between greater private-sector agricultural investment and
other economic policies outlined above. Agricultural investment by private actors,
for example, is frequently carried out on a speculative basis through intermediaries
such as banks and other financial investment institutions.^°
DECLINING DONOR COMMITMENT TO FOOD A I D
Food aid has long been used as a mechanism to redistribute food from surplus
countries to deficit countries. Levels of international food aid, however, have
declined dramatically in recent decades. In the 1990s and early 2000s, donors
regularly provided at least 10 million metric tons of food aid annually to countries
that were in need of food assistance, and in some years this figure was above 16
million metric tons. Food aid levels had already started to decline markedly when
the food crisis hit, and although they rose marginally in 2009, they fell again to a
new low of just 5 million metric tons in 2012.* '^
International food aid has historically been a controversial form of foreign
assistance, serving as both a political and economic tool for donors since its incep-
tion in the 1950s.''- In its early years, food aid was often blamed by critics for
creating dependency and market distortions in recipient countries by depressing
local production incentives, while serving as a mechanism for surplus disposal
and market expansion for donor countries. For the world's poorest and most food
insecure countries, food aid is also a highly uncertain resource, thus exacerbating
their vulnerability The level of food aid given by donors typically has an inverse
relationship with international food prices, making it difficult to rely on in times of
high and volatile food prices.^^ For a number of countries that previously received
up to a third of their cereal imports in the form of aid in the early 1990s, food
assistance dwindled to less than 10 percent of cereal imports today''''
As donors decreased the amount of food aid they provide on a regular basis,
they have also shifted that aid primarily to emergency response aid, reducing
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the amount of aid they provide for long-term assistance to the world's poorest
countries. This policy shift has a positive aspect in that it reduces dependency
and market distortions over the long-term in recipient countries.**^ However, these
changes have occurred in a context of high and rising food prices and impose hard
adjustments in the short-term for many people in these countries.^^
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FOR FOOD SECURITY: WEAK ON ECONOMIC POLICY
DRIVERS OF HUNGER
The economic policies outlined above are important in setting the context
within which people access food, regardless of the amount of food produced glob-
ally, and even regionally. Each of the policies profiled above has been recognized
as affecting levels of hunger and food insecurity in recent years, especially in
low-income countries that depend on imported food. Attempts to reshape those
policies to better promote food security, however, have been contested by those
interests that benefit from the current context.*^^  It is not surprising then that
international governance initiatives responding to global hunger have not managed
to significantly restructure the global economic framework in the context of food
security. Instead, the principal responses have focused on the adoption of more
politically salable measures that can be undertaken within the existing global eco-
nomic governance framework.
The key global food security measures since the 2008 food crisis have come
from numerous agencies and initiatives that make up the food security "regime
complex."*« These include those emanating from the G8 and G20 groups and
the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) of the United Nations.^^ The G8
and G20 have significant authority to push for economic regulations among its
members that affect food security. As a UN body, the CFS has a broader member-
ship, including civil society representation, but it has comparatively less authority
to adopt measures requiring economic policy changes among its members.'''' The
World Bank spearheaded several initiatives in response to the ongoing precarious
food security situation, while the World Trade Organization (WTO) also debated
possible changes to the trade regime to enhance food security.
The main thrust of the global governance response from these bodies has been
to boost investment in agricultural productivity in the world's poorest countries,
through both public and private sector channels. This production focus has often
been supplemented with the promotion of greater market and investment informa-
tion sharing. A long list of initiatives along these lines has been rolled out since
2008. These include the adoption of the L'Aquila Food Security Initiative (AFSI)
at the 2009 G8 Summit, accompanied by a pledge of over USD $22 billion in
assistance over three years to developing country agricultural projects.^' In 2009,
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the G20 set up the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) under
the administration of the World Bank to help channel member pledges of assis-
tance to developing country agriculture projects. In 2010, the World Bank led a
multi-agency initiative to develop voluntary Principles for Responsible Agricultural
Investment (PRAI) as a means to ensure that private sector investment did not
result in negative social and environmental outcomes.*^^
Renewed food price volatility in 2010 to
2011 sparked yet more action. In 2011, the /"i • • i i • i
^„„ . j u • f 1* Critics nave compiamed
G20 endorsed the creation of a multi-agency c
Agricultural Market Information System that theSe l
(AMIS) to disseminate information on phys- m C a S t i r e
ical commodity production and market trans- Qj^Jy ^ g e n s l o W t O COITie
actions in the hope that it would contribute to . . . ^ .,
better functioning, less volatile international ^ D O U t , D U t a l S O a r e O n l y
food markets." In 2011, the G20 launched p iecemeal , in praCtice.
a Wheat Initiative for research into genetic
improvements in wheat production.'"'* In 2012, the G8 announced the launch of the
New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, which seeks to mobilize public and
private sector investment in agricultural and food security projects in a number of
African countries." The CFS adopted the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible
Governance of Tenure for Land in 2012, and in 2013 it launched a parallel set of
guidelines on responsible agricultural investment, in response to widespread dis-
satisfaction with the World Bank sponsored PRAI.^ '^
Meanwhile, reform in the biggest commodity futures markets has been slow
and uneven. In the United States, there was some movement on the issue with the
passage of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act, but implementation of this
Act has been slow and uneven, stalled by lawsuits from industry.^' The EU, which
had only minimal rules for commodity futures trading, only recently adopted mea-
sures to reduce speculation. In both cases, these reforms were deeply resisted by
financial sector interests. Critics have complained that these regulatory measures
have not only been slow to come about, but also are only piecemeal, in practice.
The impact of biofuel policies on higher and more volatile food prices is less
controversial than the price effects of commodity speculation, but it is even harder
to get the major biofuel producing countries to agree on measures to reduce the
impact of biofuel policies on food insecurity.^ ** The major biofuel producing coun-
tries, including the United States, Brazil, and the European Union, have largely
continued to pursue policies that encourage biofuel production.'^ Powerful inter-
ests in these countries have an economic stake in promoting biofuels, and therefore
their governments are reluctant to compromise domestic renewable fuel production
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in an era of high and volatile oil prices.
Following the 2007 to 2008 food price spikes, the WTO took up the issue
of export restrictions, seeking to incorporate new rules into the Doha Round
negotiations that would exempt the least developed countries and the WFP from
export bans. In the fall of 2011, however, widespread lack of agreement led WTO
members to drop the idea of exempting the poorest countries and humanitarian
aid. More broadly, the G8, G20, CFS, and World Bank all pressed for a swift
completion of the Doha Round of trade negotiations, which was seen to have
the potential to both smooth prices by facilitating agricultural trade and rectify
longstanding imbalances in the trade system. These talks largely stalled for much
of the past decade due to reluctance of the rich countries to provide policy space
to developing countries to promote domestic food security policies that involve
measures with potential trade implications.^° Some small steps were made in Bali
toward reaching an agreement on allowing developing countries to use public grain
stocks in domestic food security policies. However, critics note that the agreement
is only temporary because it only allows such measures for a four year period,
beyond which it is unclear whether such practices will be permitted. Moreover, the
agreement only covers those countries that already have policies allowing devel-
oping countries to use public grain stocks in their domestic food security policies,
and will not allow other countries to implement them.^'
As noted above, agricultural sector investment has increased in developing
countries since the food crisis, but there has been a shift toward the promotion of
private investment. Governance initiatives that seek to guide private investment
have been largely voluntary in nature and do not mandate regulatory requirements
to ensure that human rights, land tenure, and the environment are safeguarded.^^
Food aid funding has continued to stagnate, even as a new Food Assistance
Convention was adopted in 2012. Because the new agreement no longer contains
provisions regarding an overall minimum commitment level from donors, food aid
levels may drop further in the future, especially if food prices continue to rise.
CONCLUSION
The global economic policy drivers of food insecurity have been widely
acknowledged and debated in the literature, and in policymaking forums. Action
on economic policy reform in support of food security, however, has been only
weak and selective in practice. Since the 2007 to 2008 food crisis and in the
context of an ongoing precarious global food security situation, global food secu-
rity initiatives have been situated squarely within the existing global economic
regulatory framework. These initiatives include most prominently measures to
increase food production and to share information on markets and investments in
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ways that encourage them to operate smoothly and responsibly. An outcome that
focuses on production and information over economic reform is perhaps not sur-
prising, as the former are much easier to sell politically within the powerful states
that benefit from the current economic governance framework.
The recently adopted initiatives for global food security may result in greater
quantities of food produced and better distribution of food production globally.
Indeed, there are complex links between food production and access, especially
over the long-term. But these recent initiatives, unless joined with more compre-
hensive economic policy reforms, are unlikely to make significant progress in pro-
moting access to food for the world's poorest people. Without substantial reforms
to the economic policies that encourage food price volatility and deep inequities
in the world food economy, hunger is likely to persist. More robust economic
policy reforms are required if we are to ensure that the rules that govern the global
economy do not work against the goal of food security. ' Í '
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